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14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett:
Oppression or Opportunity for U.S. Workers;
Learning from Canada†
Martin H. Malin†† and Jon M. Werner†††

I.

INTRODUCTION

Ever since its seminal Steelworkers Trilogy,1 decided in 1960, the
Supreme Court has regarded arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements (CBAs) as different in character from other types of arbitration. Whereas other types of arbitration serve as substitutes for litigation, arbitration under CBAs is a “substitute for industrial strife. . . .
[It] is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.”2
This view of labor arbitration reached its zenith in 1974 when the
Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Corp.3 declared labor
arbitration to be separate from and to operate independently of the public legal system. In Gardner-Denver, the Court held that employees
need not resort to the CBA’s grievance and arbitration procedure before
bringing a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
may proceed with their lawsuits even though they have grieved and arbitrated under the CBA and lost. To the Court, the labor arbitration
process was completely different from the public adjudication process.
The Court observed:

†

Funding for this study was provided by a grant from the National Academy of Arbitrators
Research and Education Foundation. We express our deep gratitude for the contributions of our
colleague on the grant, Sara Slinn, Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto, with whom we collaborated on this project. Together we developed the grant application
and the coding sheet. Professor Slinn recruited and selected the Osgoode Hall members of the law
student coding team and oversaw the development of the HRTO database.
††
Professor and Director, Institute for Law and the Workplace, Chicago-Kent College of Law,
Illinois Institute of Technology.
†††
Professor and Chair, Department of Management, University of Wisconsin-Whitewater.
1
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter.
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
2
Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578.
3
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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As the proctor of the bargain, the arbitrator’s task is to effectuate the intent of the parties. His source of authority is the collective-bargaining agreement, and he must interpret and apply
that agreement in accordance with the “industrial common law
of the shop” and the various needs and desires of the parties. The
arbitrator, however, has no general authority to invoke public
laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties . . . .4
On April 1, 2009, in 14 Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett,5 the Court, in
apparent disregard of a half-century of precedent, held that a “collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of
federal law.”6 The Court distinguished, and largely limited to their
facts, Gardner-Denver and its progeny. Indeed, Justice Thomas suggested that in an appropriate case, the Court might overrule GardnerDenver.7 Finding such a clear and unmistakable waiver of the judicial
forum in the CBA that covered Pyett’s employment, the Court held that
Pyett was obligated to raise his claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) through the grievance and arbitration procedure. The Court reasoned:
In this instance, the Union and the [Realty Advisory Board on
Labor Relations, Inc.], negotiating on behalf of 14 Penn Plaza,
collectively bargained in good faith and agreed that employment-related discrimination claims, including claims brought
under the ADEA, would be resolved in arbitration. This freely
negotiated term between the Union and the RAB easily qualifies
as a “conditio[n] of employment” that is subject to mandatory
bargaining under [the National Labor Relations Act].8
The Court continued:
Parties generally favor arbitration precisely because of the economics of dispute resolution. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001)
(“Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of particular importance in employment litigation, which often involves smaller sums of money

4
5
6
7
8

Id. at 53.
556 U.S. 247 (2009).
Id. at 274.
Id. at 264 n. 8.
Id. at 256.
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than disputes concerning commercial contracts”). As in any contractual negotiation, a union may agree to the inclusion of an
arbitration provision in a collective-bargaining agreement in return for other concessions from the employer.9
The Court’s citation to Circuit City is significant. In Circuit City
and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,10 cases that arose in nonunion workplaces, the Court held that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory claims imposed by employers on their employees as a
condition of employment are enforceable under the Federal Arbitration
Act.11 Notably absent from the Court’s opinion in Pyett is any discussion
of labor arbitration’s role in a private system of workplace self-governance. Also absent is a half-century of recognition that labor arbitration
is a substitute for strikes and other workplace strife. Instead, the Court
in Pyett regarded labor arbitration as just another substitute for litigation.12
The Court’s employment arbitration jurisprudence has been
roundly criticized as advantaging employers by stripping employees of
their rights to sue over discrimination and other statutory claims.13 Not
surprisingly, many scholars reacted to Pyett with similar criticism.14
Others, however, suggested that compelled arbitration of statutory
claims under CBAs may not be as oppressive to workers as compelled
arbitration under systems unilaterally imposed by employers. Professor
Sarah Cole, for example, suggested that the arbitration of statutory employment claims under CBAs will be more favorable to employees than
arbitration under individual employment agreements because of the

9

Id. at 257.
500 U.S. 20 (1991).
11
9 U.S.C. § 2.
12
See Martin H. Malin, The Evolving Schizophrenic Nature of Labor Arbitration, J. DISP.
RESOL. 57 (2010).
13
See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71 (2014); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239 (2012); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration
of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U.L. REV. 1017
(1996).
14
See, e.g., Kenneth M. Casebeer, Supreme Court Without a Clue: 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett
and the System of Collective Action and Collective Bargaining Established by the National Labor
Relations Act, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063 (2011); Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme
Court’s 2008-2009 Labor and Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253 (2009); Allan
Hyde, Labor Arbitration of Discrimination Claims After 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett: Letting Discrimination Defendants Decide Whether Plaintiffs May Sue Them, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 975
(2010); Margaret L. Moses, The Pretext of Textualism: Disregarding Stare Decisis in 14 Penn Plaza
v. Pyett, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 825 (2010).
10
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presence of the union as a repeat player to balance the employer’s influence on the process.15 Furthermore, she suggested that the grievance
arbitration forum offers employees the opportunity to vindicate their
statutory claims in ways that are faster than litigation and in a forum
in which employees do not pay the costs of their representation.16
Professor Michael Z. Green seized the Court’s decision in Pyett as
an opportunity for unions to take the lead and achieve a convergence of
interests of minority employees, majority employees, unions, and employers through the arbitration of statutory discrimination claims under CBAs.17 At the 2013 Annual Meeting of the National Academy of
Arbitrators, counsel for the parties to the CBA at issue in Pyett portrayed the arbitration system developed under the contract as a fair and
accessible forum for resolving the discrimination claims of low-wage
workers that probably would not otherwise have been litigated.18
Some attributes of employer-imposed arbitration systems are criticized for tilting the forum to favor employers, but many such attributes
are not present in arbitration under CBAs. Employees covered by CBAs
need not worry about securing representation because they have their
union to represent them. Employees covered by CBAs also incur no forum costs and are not responsible for any portion of the arbitrators’ fee.
The CBA itself is the product of active negotiation between two relatively sophisticated parties, as opposed to the arbitration system imposed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by an employer on employees who
lack bargaining power to resist. In employer-imposed arbitration systems, the employer is the only repeat player, whereas in CBAestablished arbitration systems both the employer and the union are
repeat players. Furthermore, there are no class action waivers in arbitration under CBAs.19 On the other hand, the arbitrator remains a privately accountable adjudicator dependent on maintaining acceptability
to the parties for continued business.
Statutory discrimination claims, known as human rights claims in
Canada, have been arbitrated under collective agreements in Canada
for decades. Reacting to the decision in Pyett less than two months later,

15

Sarah Rudolph Cole, Let the Grand Experiment Begin: Pyett Authorizes Arbitration of Unionized Employees’ Statutory Discrimination Claims, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 861, 862–63
(2010).
16
Id. at 863.
17
Michael Z. Green, Reading Ricci and Pyett to Provide Racial Justice Through Union Arbitration, 87 IND. L.J. 367, 369 (2012).
18
Terry Meginniss & Paul Salvatore, The Forum for Litigation of Statutory Employment
Claims After Pyett: A New Approach from Management and Labor, 66 ANN. MTG. NAT’L ACAD. OF
ARBITRATORS 271 (2013).
19
See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Prisons, 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (bNA) 1215 (2015) (Heekin, Arb.).
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National Academy of Arbitrators President and noted Canadian arbitrator Michel Picher called on his colleagues south of the border to look
to the Canadian experience and suggested that Pyett may increase employee access to justice.20
This Article takes up Mr. Picher’s invitation and looks to the experience on the northern side of the border. The study compares the handling of statutory human rights claims in labour arbitration in Ontario
to their handling before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO).
The study focuses on the time period 2009–2013. This starting point
was selected because amendments to the Ontario Human Rights Code
effective June 30, 2008 introduced substantial changes to the operation
of the HRTO.
Part II of this Article discusses the law in Canada governing the
arbitration of statutory human rights claims under collective agreements. Part III details the research methodology of the study. Part IV
presents and analyzes the data. Part V considers the implications of the
study for the continuing debate over arbitrating statutory discrimination claims under CBAs in the United States.
II. ARBITRATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS IN CANADA
At the same time that the U.S. Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver
declared CBAs and statutes to be separate spheres,21 the law was developing differently in Canada. There are three modes by which external statutes are applied in Canadian labour arbitration. First, external
law can be used as an aid to interpret the collective agreement.22 Second, any statute incorporated by reference into a collective agreement
requires arbitrators to apply that statute. Finally, at least since the
1974 Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decision in McLeod v. Egan, 23 it
is clear that arbitrators are not only permitted to look to external law,
but are obligated to do so. This jurisdiction has been confirmed and clarified in subsequent cases.24 In addition, provincial labour legislation,
which governs labour arbitration, commonly explicitly authorises labor

20

Michel Picher, Presidential Address: Access to Justice: The Silver Lining in Pyett, 62 ANN.
MTG. NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 1 (2010).
21
See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 49–50.
22
See, e.g., Re Sunnyside Home for the Aged and London & District Service Workers’ Union,
Local 220 [1985] 21 L.A.C. (3d) 85, 96 (Can.) (P.C. Picher).
23
[1975] 1 S.C.R. 517 (Can.).
24
See, e.g., Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local
324, [2003] 2 S.C.R 157 (Can.); Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929 (Can.); Ontario Nurses’
Assn. v. Orillia Soldiers Mem’l Hosp. [1999] 42 O.R. (3d) 692 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
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arbitrators to interpret and apply human rights legislation. The Ontario Labour Relations Act (OLRA),25 for instance, states:
48(12) An arbitrator or the chair of an arbitration board, as the
case may be, has power, . . .
(j) to interpret and apply human rights and other employmentrelated statutes, despite any conflict between those statutes and
the terms of the collective agreement.26
Moreover s. 54 of the OLRA provides, “A collective agreement must not
discriminate against any person if the discrimination is contrary to the
Human Rights Code or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”27
In Canada, the general approach has been to recognize concurrent
jurisdiction over human rights code matters in human rights tribunals
and labour arbitration, with human rights and arbitral tribunals permitted to defer an application where the same matter is being heard in
another proceeding.28 In British Columbia (Workers’ Comp. Bd.) v. Figliola,29 the SCC considered whether a human rights tribunal may entertain a matter that had already been decided in arbitration. The case
arose in the province of British Columbia, where the human rights legislation contains a provision analogous to the Ontario Human Rights
Code’s (OHRC) direction that the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
(HRTO) may dismiss an application where another proceeding has “appropriately dealt with the substance of the matter.”30 In Figliola, the
SCC unanimously concluded that concurrent jurisdiction is not “a statutory invitation either to judicially review another tribunal’s decision,
or to reconsider a legitimately decided issue in order to explore whether
it might yield a different outcome.”31 As a consequence of Figliola, pursuing a grievance and arbitration under a collective agreement and filing a complaint with the human rights tribunal are two separate and
mutually exclusive paths.
25

S.O. 1995, c 1, Sch A (Can.).
Id. s. 48 (12) (j).
27
Id. s. 54.
28
For example, the Ontario Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19 (Can.) (OHRC) provides
that the human rights tribunal may defer an application where the same matter is being heard in
another proceeding, and if deferred, the applicant has 60 days to bring the application back after
conclusion of the other proceeding. s. 45. However, s. 45.1 provides that the human rights tribunal
may dismiss an application where another proceeding has appropriately dealt with the substance
of the matter.
29
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 422 (Can.).
30
OHRC s. 45.1.
31
Figliola, 3 S.C.R at 442.
26
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In drawing lessons for the United States from the Canadian experience, we must be mindful of a few potentially important differences
between the two countries. First, in Canada, rather than bring their
claims in court, discrimination claimants must pursue their claims before administrative tribunals. In Ontario, the province that is the subject of our study, that tribunal is the HRTO.
Second, Ontario protects a much larger range of characteristics
against discrimination than does the United States. Under the OHRC,
protection against discrimination is afforded race, colour, ancestry,
place of origin, citizenship, ethnic origin, disability, creed (religion), sex
(including sexual harassment and pregnancy), sexual solicitation or advances, gender identity, gender expression, sexual orientation, family
status, marital status, age (18 or older), and record of offences.32 As in
the United States, a discrimination claim can be filed using multiple
bases.
Third, arbitration awards are subject to different standards of judicial review in the two countries, which could affect, for example, the
level of attention that arbitrators pay to public legal authorities. In the
U.S. private sector, courts enforce a labor arbitration award as long as
it “draws its essence” from the CBA.33 Arbitral findings of fact are not
reviewed at all by courts. “[I]mprovident, even silly, factfinding” does
not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce an award.34
U.S. courts do recognize an exception where an award violates public policy, but hold that the public policy must be “explicit, well-defined,
and dominant,” and must be “ascertained by reference to the laws and
legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public
interests.”35 Although the Supreme Court has not squarely held that an
award violates public policy only when it orders a party to violate positive law, it has never upheld a refusal to enforce an award on public
policy grounds, and the possibility of such a refusal in cases where the
award does not command a violation of positive law appears to be
mostly theoretical.36

32

OHRC s. 5.
United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
34
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001).
35
E. Associated Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 62–63 (2000).
36
In the U.S. public sector, the standard of review varies among the states. Most parrot the
language from the private sector but apply that language in a manner that allows for closer judicial
scrutiny of awards. Nevertheless, even in the public sector, arbitration awards enjoy considerable
judicial deference. See MARTIN H. MALIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 922–57 (3d ed. 2016).
33
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In Canada, the standard for judicial review for particular types of
agencies varies among jurisdictions. In Ontario, two standards of review are applicable to administrative tribunal decisions: the more deferential reasonableness standard and the standard of correctness.37 The
reasonableness standard generally applies to questions of mixed fact
and law, where “a tribunal is interpreting its own statute or statutes
closely connected to its function, with which it will have a particular
familiarity”38 or where a tribunal has “developed particular expertise in
the application of a general common law or civil law rule in relation to
a specific statutory context.”39 In contrast, correctness always applies
to true questions of jurisdiction, including questions of jurisdiction between competing specialized tribunals.40 Questions of law of central importance to the legal system and outside the tribunal’s specialized area
of expertise also utilize the correctness standard.41
The standard of reasonableness generally applies to the review of
arbitration decisions involving the application of human rights issues.
Application of human rights principles and evaluating allegations of
discrimination in the context of a particular collective agreement have
been found to utilize the reasonableness standard of review.42 Such
questions were found to involve questions of mixed fact and law, and
application of human rights principles was regarded to be within labor
arbitrators’ area of expertise.43 However, arbitration awards dealing
with the duty to accommodate disability are subject to the correctness
standard, as this duty is regarded as a principle of general law.44
III. THE STUDY
The study’s initial focus was on cases decided between 2009 and
2012. This starting point was selected because amendments to the Ontario Human Rights Code effective June 30, 2008 introduced substantial changes to the operation of the HRTO. Cases were drawn from the

37

Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (Can.). Note that prior to the 2008 Dunsmuir decision, three levels of scrutiny were applicable to judicial review of decisions of administrative tribunals: reasonableness simpliciter, patent unreasonableness, and correctness. Dunsmuir combined the two reasonableness standards into a single reasonableness standard. Id. at
192.
38
Id. at 223.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 225–26.
41
Id. at 224.
42
Ottawa Hosp. v. Ontario Pub. Serv. Emps. Union, Local 464, 2009 CanLII 9389 (Can. Ont.
S.C.D.C.) at ¶¶ 8–9.
43
Id. at ¶ 8.
44
Hall v. Ottawa Police Serv., 2008 CanLII 65766 (Can. Ont. S.C.D.C.) at ¶ 42.
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Ontario labour arbitration and HRTO databases maintained by the Canadian Legal Information Institute (CanLII).45 Only final decisions
were selected for coding. A team of six law students, three from ChicagoKent College of Law and three from Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto,
identified potentially relevant cases using the CanLII databases. They
worked in pairs of two, one Chicago-Kent student paired with an Osgoode Hall student. One pair was assigned to find all relevant arbitration awards during the specified period. Independently, each student of
this pair searched the CanLII database for awards containing the term
“human rights,” or any of the bases on which the Human Rights Code
prohibits discrimination, as well as for “accommodation” and for “harassment.” Each student submitted his or her results to Professor Malin
who reviewed them for correctness and screened out cases that did not
fit our criteria.
The other two pairs were assigned to the HRTO database. The students were instructed to exclude decisions filed under the pre-July 1,
2008 statute but decided under the post-July 1, 2008 statute (known as
transitional cases). Professor Slinn provided each pair with a master
list of all HRTO decisions issued in a given year. Each student took his
or her list and, for each tenth case in the list, reviewed that case to see
whether it met the criteria for being relevant (was a case of discrimination arising out of employment) and should not be excluded (was not a
transitional case, preliminary decision, interim decision, summary decision, or case resolution conference, but was a final decision on the substantive issue of discrimination). If the case met these requirements it
was included in the dataset; if not, then the student picked the next
case in the list until reaching a relevant one. Then, the student began
the process again. The students were instructed to continue through the
list until getting 40 relevant cases per year. Professor Slinn reviewed
their work for correctness and screened out cases that did not fit our
criteria.
The researchers trained the students on case coding and provided
them with detailed coding sheets. All six students independently coded
the same 20 cases: 10 arbitration awards and 10 HRTO decisions. Due
to inconsistencies among the coders and errors by some of the coders,
the researchers revised the coding sheet and provided additional training. The six coders independently coded another set of the same six
45

CanLII was selected because it was available free of charge to individuals in the U.S. and
Canada. It was later discovered that there may be a few relevant arbitration awards in the LexisNexis Canadian arbitration database that were not in CanLII, but there is no reason to believe
that these awards differ in any way material to the study from those available in CanLII. U.S. law
schools’ Lexis-Nexis subscriptions do not include the Canadian arbitration awards library and so
the students at Chicago-Kent only had access to CanLII.
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cases: three arbitration awards and three HRTO decisions. The results
were much more consistent and correct. From that point forward, the
coders were paired in teams of two, one from Chicago-Kent and one from
Osgoode Hall. Each team member coded a group of assigned cases independently, and then the two team members compared their results and
reconciled any differences.
The study initially examined cases decided between 2009 and 2012
and a preliminary report was presented at the 2014 annual meeting of
the National Academy of Arbitrators.46 After the researchers checked
the coding and the data further, the size of the database, particularly
the number of arbitration awards, was relatively small. The researchers
decided to expand the study to examine decisions issued in 2013. By
this point, four of the original six law student assistants had graduated.
Professor Malin identified the relevant 2013 arbitration awards and the
two remaining student assistants, one from Chicago-Kent and one from
Osgoode Hall, identified the 2013 HRTO decisions, with their determinations reviewed by the researchers. The two students then coded the
decisions independently of each other, compared their results, and reconciled the differences. All student coding was reviewed by the researchers for relevance and correctness. Decisions that did not meet the
study’s criteria were dropped from the database and coding errors were
corrected.
Professor Jon Werner, aided by two research assistants at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, loaded all coded cases into Excel
spreadsheets. Once these were reviewed, the spreadsheets for the arbitration and HRTO cases were combined into one file that was analyzed
using the Stata statistical package. Correlations between variables
were initially examined; this is denoted below by the letter “r.” If two
variables are positively correlated, this means that high values on one
variable correspond to high values of the other variable, and low values
correspond with low values. The range of r is from -1 (a perfect negative
correlation) to +1 (a perfect positive correlation), with values near zero
signifying no meaningful relationship between the variables. T-tests
were run to compare mean differences between the arbitration and
HRTO databases. A t-test addresses whether two means differ significantly from one another—that is, whether they differ beyond what
would be expected by chance alone. If a difference is not statistically
significant, the value is followed by the abbreviation “n.s.” Where feasible, t-tests were followed by regression analyses. Multiple regressions
46

Martin H. Malin et al., An Empirical Comparison of the Handling of Statutory Human
Rights Claims in Labour Arbitration and Before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 67 ANN.
MTG. NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 342 (2014).
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analyze the influence of two or more independent variables on a single
dependent variable.47
IV. THE DATA
A.

Case Outcomes

Do workers fare better in terms of obtaining either partial or full
relief for their claims in arbitration or before the HRTO? Table 1 compares the outcomes of all cases in our database. Overall, workers fared
better in arbitration than before the HRTO. Arbitration allowed a total
of 52.5% of claims, while HRTO allowed 42.6%, and this difference is
statistically significant (p < .05).48 There are many differences between
the cases brought in arbitration and those brought before the HRTO.
Accordingly, we examined which, if any, of those differences might explain the differences in case outcomes.
Table 1: Outcomes in Our Set of Cases
Claim allowed in
full

Claim allowed in
part

Claim denied

Arbitration (101)

17 (16.8%)

36 (35.7%)

48 (47.5%)

HRTO (176)

22 (12.5%)

53 (30.1%)

101 (57.4%)

In Canada, just as in the U.S., union density is higher in the public
sector than in the private sector.49 Not surprisingly, the cases that were
handled in arbitration were significantly more likely to arise in the public sector than the private sector. Table 2 presents the data.

47

Tradition and practice hold that a value should be considered statistically significant if it
falls below the p < .05 level, and preferably below the p < .01 level, corresponding respectively to
odds of 1-in-20 versus 1-in-100 of obtaining a particular value by chance alone. A signification of
p < .001 indicates odds of obtaining this variable by chance as 1-in-1000. By contrast, many social
scientists consider values falling between p = .05 and p = .10 to be “marginally” significant. These
values may be viewed as interesting enough to present to the reader, and allows the reader to
decide what practical significance should be placed upon a result obtained in a particular context.
48
In one case, Whitby Mental Health Centre & Ontario Public Service Employees Union, Local
331, 2009 CanLII 17970 (Can. Ont. L.A.) (Stout, Arb.), the arbitrator issued a consent award that
provided relief to the grievant without sustaining or denying the grievance. This case was omitted
from our tally of outcomes.
49
See Diane Galarneau & Thao Sohn, Insights on Canadian Society: Long-term trends in unionization, STATISTICS CANADA (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-006-x/2013001/
article/11878-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5L9-9M7S] (Table 2).
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Table 2: Sector of the Cases Coded
Public

Private

Unclear

Arbitration (102)

51 (50.0%)

49 (48.0%)

2 (2.0%)

HRTO (176)

31 (17.6%)

144 (81.8%)

1 (0.6%)

The difference in sector representation—that is, more public sector
cases in arbitration—is significant below the .01 confidence level. However, by itself, sector is not related to case outcomes (r = .07, n.s.). This
suggests that it is something other than sector that is influencing the
difference in outcomes between arbitration and HRTO cases in our dataset.
Claimants, called “grievors” in arbitration and “applicants” before
the HRTO, were somewhat more likely to be female before the HRTO.
Table 3 presents the data. However, by itself, grievant/applicant gender
was not related to case outcomes (r = -.08, n.s.), suggesting that neither
male nor female grievors/applicants were either advantaged or disadvantaged in how their cases were decided before their respective tribunals. It should be noted that having multiple grievors, or having a policy
grievance, is unique to arbitration, and does not occur in cases brought
to the HRTO.
Table 3: Gender of Grievors/Applicants
Male

Female

Multiple
Grievors

Policy
Grievances

Arbitration (102)

50 (49.0%)

41 (40.2%)

5 (4.9%)

6 (5.9%)

HRTO (176)

80 (45.5%)

96 (54.5%)

—

—

Table 4 shows a marked difference in the gender of the adjudicators
in the two fora, and this difference is statistically significant (p < .01).
That grievors have a better than 80% chance of proceeding before a
male arbitrator does not appear to be an anomaly limited to Canadian
labour arbitrators. For example, a 2013 survey of members of the College of Commercial Arbitrators found that 84.6% of them were men.50
50

Thomas J. Stipanowich & Zachary P. Ulrich, Arbitration in Evolution: Current Practices
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However, as with previous comparisons, adjudicator gender was not related to case outcome (r = .04, n.s.).
Table 4: Adjudicator Gender
Male

Female

Arbitration (102)

82 (80.4%)

20 (19.6%)

HRTO (176)

92 (52.3%)

84 (47.7%)

Table 5 shows the top seven grounds claimed in the cases in each
forum. Here too, there is a significant difference between the two fora,
with disability claims comprising the overwhelming majority of cases in
arbitration, whereas the claims before the HRTO were more diversified.
All mean differences shown in Table 5 are statistically significant
(p < .01).

and Perspectives of Experienced Commercial Arbitrators, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 395, 402–03
(2014). On the other hand, our database does not include cases that were settled. It is common in
Ontario for arbitrators to mediate and for grievances to settle in mediation. It is possible, but
outside the scope of this study, that women arbitrators may have had higher rates of settlements
in mediation than men arbitrators. Our data set does not enable us to determine this.
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Table 5: Top Seven Grounds Claimed
Arbitration (n= 102)

HRTO (n= 176)

Total (N= 278)

86 (84.3%)

72 (40.9%)

158 (56.8%)

Sex

5 (4.9%)

46 (26.1%)

51 (18.3%)

Race

2 (2.0%)

42 (23.9%)

48 (17.3%)

Age

5 (4.9%)

39 (22.2%)

44 (15.8%)

Reprisal/
Retaliation

2 (2.0%)

35 (19.9%)

37 (13.3%)

Colour

2 (2.0%)

34 (19.3%)

36 (12.9%)

Ethnic Origin

1 (1.0%)

27 (15.3%)

28 (10.1%)

Disability

Because of the degree to which disability claims dominated the arbitration cases, we compared case outcomes for disability claims in the
two fora. Table 6 presents the results. Interestingly, disability discrimination was found by adjudicators in a somewhat larger percentage of
the claims before the HRTO than in arbitration, yet this difference was
not statistically significant.
Table 6: A Closer Look at Disability Claims
Disability claimed

Total:

Disability found

Disability
not found

158

56 (35.4%)

102 (64.6%)

Arbitration (102)

86

28 (32.6%)

58 (67.4%)

HRTO (176)

72

28 (38.9%)

44 (61.1%)

Although caution must be exercised in making inferences because
of the small sample size, race and sex discrimination were significantly
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more likely to be found before the HTRO than in arbitration. Table 7
presents the data. The differences by forum are statistically significant
(p < .05).
Table 7: Sex and Race Discrimination Claim Details
Sex Discrimination
Claims

Total

Denied

46

14

24

8

5

4

—

1

Combined:

51

18

24

9

Race Discrimination
Claims

Total

Denied

Allowed
in part

41

31

8

2

2

2

—

—

43

33

8

2

HRTO
Arbitration

HRTO
Arbitration

Combined:

Allowed
in part

Allowed
in full

Allowed
in full

Across both fora, claims of sex discrimination were more likely to
be allowed (p < .01) and claims of race discrimination were more likely
to be denied (p < .01). This appears to be driven by a high degree of selfrepresentation among HRTO race discrimination claimants. In 14, or
30.4%, of HRTO sex claims the applicant was self-represented while the
respondent was represented, compared to 22, or 52.4% of, race claims.
Despite the small sample size, a t-test found the difference statistically
significant at p < .05. As discussed more fully below, self-represented
applicants fare significantly poorer before the HRTO. Multivariate regression analysis of sex discrimination claims found, somewhat surprisingly, that the gender of the adjudicator was not a significant influence
on the outcome, but the forum was. Table 8 presents that data from
regression analysis.
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Table 8: Case Outcomes in Sex Discrimination Claims
Variable

Fora (Arbitration vs. HRTO)

Adjudicator gender
Sex discrimination claimed

Coefficient

.23

-.10
.30

P value

.001

.123 (n.s.)
.001

In every case in our arbitration database, all parties appeared at
the hearing. In 13 cases before the HRTO, the respondent failed to appear. As shown in Table 9, not surprisingly, respondents who did not
appear fared much worse than those who did. The results were statistically significant (p < .01) but when those cases were removed from the
database, the results of subsequent regression analysis were not impacted. Thus, because the number of cases where respondents did not
appear was so small, the outcomes from these 13 cases did not account
for the overall difference in outcomes between arbitration and the
HRTO.
Table 9: HRTO Results Where Respondent Did Not Appear
Respondent
appeared

Respondent
did not appear

Denied

98 (60.5%)

3 (23.1%)

Allowed in part

48 (29.6%)

4 (30.8%)

Allowed in full

16 (9.9%)

6 (46.1%)

There was a marked difference in the representation of parties in
arbitration compared to those before the HRTO. In every arbitration
case, both parties were represented. From the written records available,
it was not possible to determine in every case whether the representative was an attorney, yet we are confident that in every case the representative was a professional, such as a non-attorney professional union
advocate. By contrast, before the HRTO, a majority of applicants were
self-represented, as were about an eighth of respondents. When a respondent was a small corporate entity that was represented by its
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owner, we coded the respondent as self-represented. Thirty-nine
(22.2%) of the HRTO cases arose in unionized workplaces. Most HRTO
cases (115 or 65.3%) did not indicate whether the workplace was unionized, and it is likely that some of those cases also arose in unionized
workplaces. However, among the HRTO cases involving unionized employees, the applicant representation rate was not much different from
the representation rate in HRTO cases as a whole. Table 10 presents
the breakdown of representation in HRTO cases.
Table 10: Party Representation
Respondent
Represented

Arbitration

102 (100%)

HRTO

154 (87.5%)

Unionized
HRTO Cases

Respondent
Self-Represented
0

Grievor/Applicant Represented
102 (100%)

Grievor/Applicant
Self-Represented
0

22 (12.5%)

77 (44.3%)

97 (55.7%)

23

—

—

23 (60.5%)

15

—

15 (39.5%)

—

As shown in Table 11, not surprisingly, self-represented parties
fared far worse than represented parties. Self-represented applicants
had more cases denied than those who were represented (p < .01), and
self-represented respondents had fewer cases denied than those who
were represented (p < .01). As Table 12 shows, among HRTO applicants
known to be unionized, the disparity in results between self-represented and represented parties was even greater.
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Table 11: HRTO Outcomes by Representation
Respondent
Represented

Respondent
Self-Represented

Grievor/Applicant Represented

Grievor/Applicant Self-Represented

Denied

92 (59.7%)

9 (40.9%)

32 (41.6%)

68 (70.1%)

Allowed in part

42 (27.3%)

11 (50.0%)

31 (40.2%)

22 (22.7%)

Allowed in full

20 (13.0%)

2 (9.1%)

14 (18.2%)

7 (7.2%)

Table 12: Unionized HRTO Outcomes by Representation
Claim allowed
in full

Claim allowed
in part

Claim denied

Applicant Self-Represented/ Respondent Represented (23)

0

2 (8.7%)

21 (91.3%)

Applicant Represented/Respondent Represented (15)

2 (13.3%)

6 (40.0%)

7 (46.7%)

Not recorded (1)

1

As Table 13 shows, comparing outcomes only for cases where both
parties are represented, the differences between arbitration and the
HRTO are not statistically significant. Indeed, the rates at which claims
are denied are almost identical. Therefore, from the lack of significant
impact on case outcomes of the various factors by which arbitration and
HRTO cases differ, which we have previously reviewed (sector, prevalence of disability claims, gender of claimants, gender of adjudicators,
failures by respondents to appear), and the dramatic impact on case
outcomes of the absence of representation, we conclude that it is highly
likely that the significantly higher success rate for claimants in arbitration over the HRTO is mostly attributable to differences in claimant
representation. All grievors in arbitration were represented, while most
applicants before the HRTO were self-represented.

14 MALIN-WERNER PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

347]

12/5/17 8:54 AM

OPPRESSION OR OPPORTUNITY

365

Table: 13 HRTO vs. Arbitration Outcomes Where
Both Parties Were Represented
Arbitration
(all represented)

HRTO (where all are
represented)

Denied

48 (47.5%)

31 (47.7%)

Allowed in part

38 (35.7%)

25 (38.5%)

Allowed in full

17 (16.8%)

9 (13.8%)

B.

Speed and Efficiency

A common view of arbitration is that it is a faster and more efficient
dispute resolution process than litigation. A comparison of the arbitral
and HRTO fora shows considerable, though not uniform, support for
this commonly held view.
Table 14 shows the breakdown of adverse employment actions challenged in each forum. Where more than one action was challenged, the
first adverse action was coded. Thus, if a denial of a training opportunity was followed months later by a discharge, the case was coded as
a denial of training. In subsequent tables showing elapsed time, the
elapsed time was calculated from the first adverse action that was challenged in the claim. For example, in a case challenging a denial of training and a subsequent discharge, the elapsed time was calculated from
the training denial.
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Table 14: Stage Grievance/Complaint Occurred
Arbitration
(n= 102)
Pre-employment/hiring

HRTO
(n= 176)

Total
(N= 278)

0 (0.0%)*

21 (11.9%)*

21 (7.6%)

Normal course of
employment

21 (20.6%)*

84 (47.7%)*

105 (37.8%)

Promotion/transfer/assignment

20 (19.6%)*

14 (8.1%)*

34 (12.2%)

Dismissal/firing

36 (35.3%)

49 (27.8%)

85 (30.6%)

3 (2.9%)

1 (0.6%)

4 (1.4%)

22 (21.6%)*

7 (3.9%)*

29 (10.4%)

Resignation

Other (e.g., accommodation)

All starred differences are significant (p < .01)

Of course, none of the grievances that were arbitrated occurred in
the hiring process because employees are not subject to the collective
agreement until they are hired. Table 15 excludes hiring claims and
combines the remaining claims to show those that arose during the employment relationship and those that involved employment termination. The differences are not significant and this is unchanged when
sector is added in—i.e., this is not a function of the differences in publicversus private-sector cases in general.
Table 15: Stage Grievance/Complaint Arose (Excluding Hiring)
During employment
relationship
Employment relationship ended

Arbitration
(n= 101)
62 (61.4%)
39 (38.6%)

HRTO (n= 155)

Total (N= 256)

105 (67.7%)

167 (65.2%)

50 (32.3%)

89 (34.8%)

Thus, in both fora, approximately two-thirds of the claims (other
than hiring claims) arose during the employment relationship. In contrast, Table 16 shows a marked difference as to when the claims are
filed between arbitration and HRTO claims. The difference is highly
statistically significant (p < .001). In arbitration, the 43 grievances filed
after employment ended is only four more than the total number of
grievances (39) challenging termination or resignation. In other words,
employees grieving adverse actions that arise while they are employed
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do so while they are still employed. In contrast, employees complaining
to the HRTO of adverse actions that arise while they are still employed
generally wait until they are fired or they quit before filing their complaints. This is consistent with a recent study, which found that in nonunion workplaces in Ontario, fewer than 10% of wage-hour claims are
filed with the Ministry of Labour while the claimant remains employed
by the employer.51
Table 16: Stage Grievance/Claim Filed
(Excluding Hiring Cases)
During employment
relationship
Employment ended

Arbitration
(n= 100)
57 (57.0%)

HRTO (n= 156)

Total (N= 256)

29 (18.6%)

86 (33.6%)

43 (43.0%)

127 (81.4%)

170 (66.4%)

This difference is statistically significant (p< .001)

There is some indication that the presence of a union leads to employees bringing their claims more quickly than in non-union environments. Table 17 shows the stage of the employment relationship at
which the claim arose in unionized HRTO cases, and Table 18 shows
the stage at which the claim was filed in unionized HRTO cases. It appears that unionized employees act faster than their non-union counterparts even when they pursue redress before the HRTO rather than
in arbitration.
Table 17: Stage HRTO Complaint Occurred
During employment
relationship
Employment relationship ended

All HRTO
(n= 155)
105 (67.7%)

50 (32.3%)

Unionized HRTO
(n= 34)
31 (91.2%)

3 (8.8%)

Other HRTO
(n= 121)
74 (61.2%)

47 (38.8%)

This difference is statistically significant (p < .01)

51

John Grundy et al., The Enforcement of Ontario’s Employment Standards Act: The Impact
of Reforms 12 (June 27, 2015) (unpublished paper presented to Second Biennial Meeting, Labor
Law Research Network, Amsterdam) (on file with the authors).
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Table 18: Stage HRTO Complaint Filed
All HRTO
(n= 156)
29 (18.6%)

During employment
relationship
Employment ended

Unionized HRTO
(n= 36)
17 (47.2%)

127 (81.4%)

19 (52.8%)

Other HRTO
(n= 120)
12 (10.0%)

108 (90.0%)

This difference is statistically significant (p < .001)

Thus, workers not covered by collective agreements tend not to seek
redress for alleged discrimination until they are terminated or they
quit. Workers who grieve discrimination pursuant to procedures in
their collective agreements are more likely to do so while the employment relationship continues. This difference translates into substantial
differences in the amount of time it takes to resolve claims in each forum. Table 19 presents the data concerning elapsed time from various
marker events in these cases, for the time period 2009–2013.
Table 19: Elapsed Time 2009–2013
Elapsed time
(in days):

Arbitration
(n= 102)

HRTO
(n= 176)

Difference
(stat. signif.)

From event to filing

26.6
(30 cases)

239.0
(60 cases)

212.4 days
(Arb., p < .01)

From event to hearing start

396.9
(75 cases)

827.0
(60 cases)

430.1 days
(Arb., p < .01)

From event to decision

736.9
(79 cases)

931.9
(127 cases)

195.0 days
(Arb., p < .05)

From filing to hearing start

410.2
(39 cases)

538.1
(45 cases)

127.9 days
(Arb., n.s.)

From filing to decision

819.7
(41 cases)

713.5
(84 cases)

106.2 days
(HRTO, n.s.)

From hearing start to hearing end

224.8
(97 cases)

30.8
(81 cases)

196.5 days
(HRTO, p < .01)

From hearing start to decision

297.0
(97 cases)

193.8
(82 cases)

103.2 days
HRTO, n.s.)

From hearing end to decision

72.1
(98 cases)

156.4
(83 cases)

84.3 days
(Arb., p < .01)

Length of hearing

4.7 days
(96 cases)

2.0 days
(107 cases)

2.7 days
(HRTO, p < .01)
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Because 2009 was the first year the HRTO was operating under its
new procedures, we calculated elapsed time excluding 2009, to determine whether the HRTO might have needed a year to get up to speed
under the new system. Table 20 presents the data for 2010–2013, excluding the 2009 cases.
Table 20: Elapsed Time 2010–2013
Elapsed time
(in days):

Arbitration
(n= 102)

HRTO
(n= 163)

Difference
(stat. signif.)

From event to filing

26.6
(30 cases)

249.7
(51 cases)

223.1 days
(Arb., p < .01)

From event to hearing start

396.9
(75 cases)

874.1
(52 cases)

477.2 days
(Arb., p < .01)

From event to decision

736.9
(79 cases)

972.2
(115 cases)

235.3 days
(Arb., p < .05)

From filing to hearing start

410.2
(39 cases)

577.8
(38 cases)

167.6 days
(Arb., p < .05)

From filing to decision

819.7
(41 cases)

752.7
(75 cases)

67.0 days
(HRTO, n.s.)

From hearing start to hearing end

224.8
(97 cases)

33.3
(76 cases)

191.5 days
(HRTO, p < .01)

From hearing start to decision

297.0
(97 cases)

208.0
(74 cases)

89.0 days
(HRTO, n.s.)

From hearing end to decision

72.1
(98 cases)

167.4
(75 cases)

95.3 days
(Arb., p < .01)

Length of hearing

4.7 days
(96 cases)

2.0 days
(98 cases)

2.7 days
(HRTO, p < .01)

The results are consistent with or without the 2009 cases, and several comparisons are notable. Because workers covered by collective
agreements do not wait to be fired to file their claims, grievances are
filed less than a month following the event that is the subject of the
complaint. In contrast, HRTO applicants tend to wait until they are
fired to file, resulting in claims being filed on average almost ten times
later, vis-à-vis the initial event complained of than in arbitration.
Grievors also get to hearings faster after filing the grievances than applicants get before the HRTO, but the difference is not significant. Overall, grievors get a decision in significantly less time after the event giving rise to the claim, and that is due mostly to grievors filing quickly
after the initial event rather than waiting until they are fired.
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Measured from the start of the hearing, the difference in time it
takes to complete the process to the rendering of a decision is not significant. HRTO proceedings take significantly less time from the start
of the hearing to the end of the hearing. This is partly due to arbitration
taking about twice as many hearing days as HRTO cases. From our observations of the actual cases, multi-day arbitration hearings are much
less likely to be held on consecutive days than HRTO hearings. Many
arbitration hearings were spread out over a year or longer. On the other
hand, arbitrators are more than twice as fast in issuing their decisions
than HRTO adjudicators. We suggest that this is a positive effect of arbitrators’ need to maintain acceptability with the parties. An easy way
for arbitrators to lose their acceptability is to be late with their decisions. To check this, we conducted regression analyses to see if sector
or grounds claimed might affect elapsed time and therefore account for
what appears to be differences based on forum. Table 21 presents the
results. Unless otherwise noted, all main differences highlighted are
statistically significant at p < .05.
Table 21: Elapsed Time Adding Sector and Major Claims
Elapsed time:

Main differences

From event to filing

Arbitration faster, slightly faster in private sector
(p < .10); no effect for disability, sex, race

From event to hearing start

Arbitration faster; slightly faster in private sector; no
effect for disability or sex; race slightly slower (p < .10)

From event to decision

Arbitration faster; faster in private sector; no effect for
disability, sex, race

From filing to hearing start

Arbitration faster; faster in private sector; no effect for
disability or sex; race slightly slower (p < .10)

From filing to decision

Faster in private sector; no effect for disability, sex, race

From hearing start to hearing end

HRTO faster; faster in private sector; no effect for disability, sex, race

From hearing start to decision

Faster in private sector; no effect for disability, sex, race

From hearing end to decision

Arbitration faster; faster in private sector; no effect for
disability, sex, race (disability claims slightly slower,
p < .10)
HRTO faster; faster in private sector; no effect for disability, sex, race

Length of hearing
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The one consistent result is that cases proceed faster in the private
sector. As noted above, cases in arbitration are more likely to arise in
the public sector. These findings reinforce, rather than diminish, the
speed advantages of arbitration, which we attribute to claims being
filed soon after they arise and the arbitrator’s need to issue a decision
quickly to maintain acceptability. We also looked at whether the parties
that were represented had any impact on elapsed time, and in general,
there were no statistically significant differences in elapsed time based
upon representation. The one exception was that when HRTO applicants were represented, their hearings averaged 2.5 days, whereas the
hearings for self-represented HRTO applicants averaged 1.7 days, and
this difference was statistically significant (p < .05).
C.

Remedies

In theory, the same remedies are available in arbitration and before the HRTO. However, as shown in Tables 22 and 23, there are significant differences in the remedies requested in each forum, as well as
in the remedies awarded.
Table 22: Remedies Sought
Reinstatement

Back
Pay

Education/
Training

Create/Revise
Policy

24
(23.5%)

Compensatory
Damages
20
(19.6%)

Arbitration
(102)

27
(26.5%)

HRTO
(176)

6
(3.4%)

Other

2
(2.0%)

Reporting on
Human
Rights
Issues
2
(2.0%)

1
(1.0%)

36
(20.5%)

59
(33.5%)

19
(10.8%)

15
(8.5%)

1
(0.6%)

—

28
(27.5%)

The differences for Reinstatement (p < .01), Compensatory Damages (p < .05),
Education/Training (p < .01), and Create/Revise Human Rights Policy (p < .05) are
statistically significant.
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Table 23: Remedies Awarded

Arbitration

HRTO

Reinstatement

Back
pay

Compensatory
Damages

Other/
Monetary
Damages

22
(21.6%)

8
(7.8%)

12
(11.8%)

4
(3.9%)

0

25
(14.2%)

0

70
(39.8%)

Education/
Training
—

33
(18.8%)

Creating/ Revising
Human
Rights
Policy
2
(2.0%)

Cease
& Desist

19
(10.8%)

1
(0.5%)

2
(2.0%)

The mean differences for Reinstatement, Compensatory Damages, Other/Monetary
Damages, Education/Training, and Creating/Revising Human Rights Policy are all
statistically significant (p < .01).

Remedies in arbitration tend more to reinstatement and back pay
than to compensatory damages. This is in contrast to the HRTO, where
they tend more toward damages, and reinstatement is rarely requested
and never ordered, even though the HRTO has the authority to award
it. We believe this phenomenon may share common characteristics with
the phenomenon seen earlier—HRTO claimants do not file their claims
until after they are fired. A likely reason is fear of retaliation. Such fear
is less likely to be present where the claimant will be protected by a
union. Indeed, as seen earlier, in unionized workplaces, claimants who
forgo grieving and instead file with the HRTO do so right away, i.e.,
they do not wait until they are fired. Because they view the work environment as hostile, terminated workers who do not have union support
may not seek reinstatement because they do not want to return to the
employer who discharged them. We regard the availability and use of
reinstatement as a remedy in arbitration to be a positive attribute of
that forum.
On the other hand, what the HRTO terms “public interest remedies,” such as requiring education or training on human rights, creating
or revising human rights policies, and reporting on human rights compliance, are common before the HRTO and almost non-existent in arbitration. Table 24 singles out these differences.
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Table 24: Public Interest Remedies
Education/Training

Arbitration

HRTO

Creating/Revising
Human Rights Policy

Reporting on Human Rights Issues

0

2

0

33

20

1

Public interest remedies occur almost exclusively in HRTO; this
difference by forum is statistically significant (p < .01). Follow-up analyses revealed that this difference is not impacted by adjudicator gender
or applicant gender (both n.s.); that is, public interest remedies are not
more likely to be awarded by female adjudicators or for female
grievors/applicants. It might be asked whether the rarity of public interest remedies in arbitration resulted from the dominance of disability
claims in that forum. It is possible, for example, that many disability
claims could be for individual accommodations that do not lend themselves to public interest remedies. Results of follow-up regression analysis, however, show just the opposite. This is presented in Table 25.
Table 25: Public Interest Remedies and Grounds Found
Coefficient
Forum

-.14

Sector

t

Significance
-3.15

P < .01

.07

1.61

n.s.

Race

.62

4.64

P < .01

Disability

.27

5.91

P < .01

Sex

.27

4.31

P < .01

Age

.14

0.96

n.s.

A finding of disability is significantly positively related with the
award of public interest remedies, while the arbitration forum is significantly negatively related with the award of public interest remedies.
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We believe that this aspect of remedies practice may reflect the negative effects of arbitrator need to maintain acceptability. Public interest
remedies are the remedies that intrude the most on the respondent. An
arbitrator dependent on the parties’ selection of that arbitrator for future work may be more likely to shy away from awarding such intrusive
remedies, especially if the moving party is not seeking them. On the
other hand, as the data show, the HRTO is not bashful about awarding
these intrusive remedies, even where the applicant has not requested
them.
The absence of public interest remedies in arbitration may also reflect the effects of a unionized environment. In a unionized workplace,
an employer may be more likely to have human rights policies in place
and may agree to needed refinements in arbitrator-initiated mediation.
Such agreed-to refinements would not appear in the awards and would
not appear in our database. We are unable to test for this.
A key difference between the fora is that the HRTO orders public
interest remedies even when a party has not requested them. A sense
of fairness internalized by many arbitrators may inhibit their awarding
remedies that were not requested. It is possible that HRTO adjudicators
award public interest remedies even when not requested by the applicant out of concern that self-represented applicants may not know to
request them. Therefore, we looked at whether an applicant being selfrepresented made a difference in the awarding of public interest remedies even though the applicant had not requested them. In the 97 cases
where HRTO applicants were self-represented, seven public interest
remedies were requested, and 15 were awarded. However, for the 77
HRTO cases where applicants were represented, 15 public interest remedies were requested, and 39 were awarded. Thus, it cannot be said that
HRTO adjudicators were awarding public interest remedies to make up
for what self-represented applicants failed to request for themselves.
D. Is Arbitration Lawless?
One concern expressed with the arbitration of statutory claims is
that privately appointed and privately accountable arbitrators will be
developing the public law. As Table 26 shows, in this dataset, this concern is much more theoretical than real. For arbitrators and HRTO tribunal adjudicators, deciding a novel issue of law occurs extremely
rarely, and there is no meaningful difference between the fora in how
often this occurs. This is likely because the substantive law had been
well-developed by 2009. The role played by arbitrators, if any, in developing that law is outside the scope of this study.
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Table 26: Did Tribunal Decide a Novel Issue of Law?
Yes

No

Arbitration (n= 100)

3 (3.0%)

97 (97.0%)

HRTO (n= 176)

2 (1.1%)

174 (98.9%)

t

P

1.11

n.s.

No effect for Disability and Adjudicator Gender.

However, as reflected in Tables 27 through 30, the two fora take
different approaches to the law. We also added in sector, disability, and
adjudicator gender, and, in general, results were unchanged when these
additional variables were included in our analyses.
Table 27: Did Tribunal Distinguish Authorities?
Yes

No

Arbitration (n= 102)

24 (23.5%)

78 (76.5%)

HRTO (n= 176)

22 (12.5%)

154 (87.5%)

t

P

2.38

.05

When Sector is included, Forum becomes non-significant; no effect for Adjudicator
Gender.

Table 28: Did Tribunal Criticize or Refuse to
Follow Authorities?
Yes

No

Arbitration (n= 102)

9 (8.8%)

93 (91.2%)

HRTO (n= 176)

4 (2.3%)

172 (97.7%)

t

P

2.50

.05

No effect for Sector, Disability, or Adjudicator Gender.

Table 29: Did Tribunal Identify and Reconcile Authorities?
Yes
Arbitration (n= 102)
HRTO (n= 176)

No

14 (13.7%)

88 (86.3%)

4 (2.3%)

172 (97.7%)

No effect for Sector, Disability, or Adjudicator Gender.

t

P

3.81

.01
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Table 30: Authorities Cited
Human
Rights
Statute
Arbitration

86
(84.3%)

Human
Rights
Tribunal Decisions
30
(29.4%)

HRTO

174
(98.9%)

133
(75.6%)

Court
Decisions

Collective
Agreement

Arbitration
Award
s

Charter of
Rights

International
Law

Other

55
(53.9%)

78
(76.5%)

70
(68.6%)

4
(3.9%)

0

50
(49.0%)

122
(69.3%)

9
(5.1%)

7
(4.0%)

2
(1.1%)

0

45
(25.6%)

All bolded mean differences are statistically significant (p < .01), except for Court
Decisions, which is statistically significant at p < .05.

Although relatively rare in either forum, arbitrators are more
likely to criticize or refuse to follow established authority or to identify
and reconcile established authorities. They are also more likely to distinguish established authority, although that appears to be due to the
higher rate of public sector cases in arbitration. Of greater concern, arbitrators are far more likely to cite themselves or other arbitrators, and
far less likely to cite public bodies such as human rights tribunals and
courts.52
V.

LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The experience in Canada can inform the debate in the United States
over Pyett. The parties to the CBA—that is, both management and the
union—in Pyett portray their system as a fast, inexpensive forum for
claims of low-wage workers that would not otherwise have been heard.53
To a large extent, the experience in Ontario supports that claim. The
law in Ontario is sufficiently well-developed such that very few cases
raise novel legal issues; both arbitrators and the HRTO are largely applying established law to the facts as they find them. Arbitration provides a forum that is accessible and can resolve claims relatively quickly
after they arise. Claimants do not wait until they are fired to file. Moreover, claimants in arbitration are always represented, whereas claimants before the HRTO are mostly self-represented. That concern applies equally in the United States for low-wage workers whose claims
52

An earlier study in Quebec had a similar finding. See Guylaine Vallée et al., Implementing
Equality Rights in the Workplace: An Empirical Study, 9 CANADIAN LAB. & EMP. L.J. 77, 100
(2002). This may be a function of what parties cite to the adjudicators. It may be that parties cite
more arbitration awards than tribunal or court decisions to arbitrators but we are unable to determine whether this is the case.
53
See Meginniss & Salvatore, supra note 18.
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are frequently not of sufficient value to attract legal representation. Arbitration is the forum where discharged employees can get their jobs
back and return to a workplace where they will be supported by a union.
The Ontario experience, however, does call for some notes of caution. The presence of repeat players on both sides does not completely
counteract the negative effects of arbitrator need to maintain acceptability. We saw this with respect to remedies; arbitrators very rarely
award public interest remedies. Although those types of remedies are
generally not available in the typical individual discrimination case in
the U.S., the phenomenon of adjudicators’ need for acceptability intruding on administration of the statutory scheme is something we must be
vigilant about if statutory discrimination claims are to be resolved
through CBA grievance and arbitration systems. That Canadian arbitrators appear to be a bit looser than public tribunals in their handling
of public legal authorities suggests that if Pyett-type arbitration catches
on in the United States, courts may have to rethink the level of deference they give to arbitration awards in such cases. Finally, the gender
composition of Canadian arbitrators is likely comparable to the U.S.
Although our data found that gender did not directly correlate with case
outcomes, even in sex discrimination cases, having a forum where the
adjudicators are 80% male does give an appearance of bias, even if no
bias is actually present.
Parties and courts in the United States should move cautiously
when considering mandating that workers covered by a CBA grieve and
arbitrate their statutory discrimination claims. For example, parties
pursuing this approach should consider designating a panel of arbitrators that is demographically diverse, particularly with respect to race,
ethnicity, and gender. However, as claimed by the parties to the CBA
at issue in Pyett, this approach can provide an accessible forum for lowwage workers whose claims might otherwise never be brought because
of their low dollar value.

